The third round of nuclear negotiations between Iran and
P5+1 is well under way in Geneva. Both proponents
of peace, and of war, are looking to the outcome of these negotiations with
abated breath. Hope and fear abound, an
understanding of the demands and expectations is a good indicator of the
direction these talks are likely to take.
Moreover, the key to the
potential of these talks is to review why Iran’s nuclear program is the subject
of these negotiations in the first place.
The Road to Sanctions
– and Talks
At the onset of the 1979 revolution, Iran abandoned its
nuclear power program.
However, the
considerable damage to Iran’s infrastructure during the Iran-Iraq war, and the
demand by the growing population prompted the Iranian government to revisit and
resume its quest for nuclear power.
It
announced these intentions in 1982.
Thereon, the United States made every attempt
to stop Iran – unsuccessfully (see details
HERE).
In 2002, Israel provided the means to place further
obstacles in Iran’s path.
It provided
the MEK terrorist group a report indicating Iran had undertaken clandestine
activities
[i].
Iran came under scrutiny for building nuclear
sites
(which it was entitled to as an
NPT member).
In 2003, as an act of
goodwill, Iran voluntary suspended its enrichment program for two years and
allowed intrusive inspections in order to alleviate concerns over its peaceful
nuclear program (
The
Iran-EU Agreement).
To understand what pursued, it is imperative to review the
Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to
which Iran is a signatory.
The main
pillars of the NPT are non-proliferation (Articles I & II), disarmament
(Article VI), and peaceful uses of nuclear energy (Articles III and IV).
While Article IV reiterates
the "inalienable right" of member
states to research, develop, and use nuclear energy for non-weapons purposes,
Article III demands that non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty
“undertake to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated
and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency.”
Iran concluded such and agreement with the
IAEA.
There is consensus that Iran has not proliferated. In other
words, it has not weaponized or helped another state weaponize, nor has it
received or delivered weapons material from or to another state.
This much is indisputable.
Furthermore, in 2005, the IAEA reported that
all declared fissile material in Iran had been accounted for,
and none had been diverted.
Yet, contrary to its findings, and in direct conflict with
the safeguard agreement it had concluded with Iran, specifically
Article
19 (the Agency may refer Iran to the UN Security Council if it is “unable
to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be
safeguarded under this agreement, to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices”), the IAEA reported that Iran “
had violated Tehran’s IAEA
safeguards agreement.”
What led to this decision was a
push by the United States.
This was made possible due to the fact that
there is no definition of non-compliance.
As the prominent
Arms Control Association opines: “
Surprisingly, although the IAEA Board of Governors has determined on
five occasions that a state was in noncompliance with its NPT safeguards
agreement-Iraq (1991), Romania (1992), North Korea (1993), Libya (2004), and
Iran (2006)-there remains no established definition of
noncompliance.”
Iran’s nuclear
dossier was sent to the United Nations Security Council. Politics and America’s might prevailed at the
expense of international treaties – and Iran. Sanctions -- war by other means, were imposed
on Iran. Numerous round of negotiations have
only brought harsher sanctions – and progress in Iran’s civilian program.
Current Demands
According to Western sources, there have been
three
demands placed on Iran: 1) limiting the 3.5% enriched uranium, 2)
suspension of 20% enriched uranium, 3) halting the construction of the Arak
heavy water plant.
It has also been
reported that Iran is required to ratify the Additional Protocol.
Given that the talks hang on these issues,
they must be explored.
Limitations on 3.5%
enriched uranium - Uranium enriched
below 5% is strictly used for fuel. There are several reasons why Iran has ‘drawn a red line’ on its right to enrich
uranium:
Bulletin
26 –
Dual Use: Avoiding The Nuclear
Precipice of the International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against
Proliferation
(INESAP) confirms that Iran’s
share in the French uranium enrichment plant --
Eurodif , and France’s refusal to
supply Iran with [its own] enriched uranium for use in its power plants, which
according to them, justifies Iran’s desire to exercise her inalienable right
under Article IV of the NPT to enrich uranium indigenously versus importing
from any other country.
As important, if not of more concern to the Tehran, is the
undeniable fact that prior to the Iranian revolution the United States had
signed National Security Decision Memorandums
(NSDM) that demanded of Iran to be a hub for
enriching and distributing uranium to profit the United States
(see full article HERE).
Suspension of 20%
Enrichment -
20% enriched uranium is
used to produce medical isotopes.
In a
1999 report by the
Department of Energy two important issues stand out -- a coming shortage in
medical isotopes, and a promise of new treatments such as ' isotopes for cancer
therapy and pain control'.
There are simply not enough medical isotopes to meet
demand. It is important to note that
Iran uses LEU (low enriched uranium) of under 20% to produce medical
isotopes. In sharp contrast, the United
States supplies weapon-grade uranium (HEU, 90-percent 235U) to the Canadian radioisotope
producers. Not only are there inherent
dangers (and legal hurdles) in transporting weapons grade material, but also
the conversion of HEU to LEU is a feat in itself.
Demanding a stop to the production of medical isotopes in
the face of growing demand and shortage reflects the callous nature of the
demands being placed on Tehran.
The Arak Heavy Water
Plant - The media, egged on by Western countries, has been quick to refer
to Arak heavy water plant as a ‘plutonium plant for making bombs’. This is patently false.
Any
reactor
fueled by uranium can be used to produce Plutonium, including light water
reactors. According
to World Nuclear Association “Plutonium, both that routinely made in power reactors and that
from dismantled nuclear weapons, is a valuable energy source when integrated
into the nuclear fuel cycle.” Reactor grade plutonium
is
a by-product of typical used fuel
from a nuclear reactor. Weapons grade plutonium is recovered from uranium fuel
that has been irradiated 2-3 months in a plutonium
production reactor.
Arak is a heavy
water reactor (HWR) of the type highly recommended by the IAEA. A 2002 IAEA publication encouraged the use of heavy water reactors
stating: “HWR technology offers fuel flexibility, low operating costs
and a high level of safety, and therefore represents an important option for
countries considering nuclear power programmes. “
Contrary to NPT commitments, the Treaty is
being used as a political tool ‘doling out’ assistance to chosen allies, while
depriving others.
Geneva 3
The current negotiations are said to be a ‘beginning’ in
which Iran has to meet the above demands in exchange for ‘some easing of
sanctions’, and with ‘all options on the table’. This cowboy diplomacy has been in the making
for years.
In 2007, while still a junior senator, Barack Obama had
“crippling sanctions” in mind for the Iranian people
when he introduced S. 1430 in 2007. His commitment caught the attention of
AIPAC's president and a major donor to his campaign: Lee Rosenberg. In 2008, during his presidential run, he
addressed AIPAC:
"Our willingness to pursue diplomacy
will make it easier to join our cause. If Iran fails to change course when presented
with this choice by the United States it will be clear to the people of Iran
and to the world that the Iranian regime is the author of its own isolation and
that will strengthen our hand with Russia and China as we insist on stronger
sanctions in the Security Council.”
But Mr. Obama’s vision is
as limited as his knowledge of Iranians.
During the Iran-Iraq war, isolated,
disarrayed, and reeling from a revolution, Iran repelled not only Iraq’s
attacks, but all its backers including America, European and Arab states. Today, Iran is in a much stronger position
not only by virtue of its defense forces, its determination and
accomplishments, but also due to its relations with the outside world. Iran has the full backing of the Non-Aligned
Movement’s (NAM)120 countries as well as powerful allies including Russia.
These negotiations present a unique opportunity – not for
the United States, but for the revival of international law and treaties – and the
rejection if imperialism. Let us hope
that the opportunity is not plundered.
[i] Connie
Bruck, “A reporter at large: Exiles; How Iran’s expatriates are gaming the
nuclear threat”.
The New Yorker, March
6, 2006
